di Bengisu Kaja – 24/11/2025 –
Judiciary–Politics Tension: A Democratic Analysis Through the İmamoğlu Case in Turkey and the Justice Reform Referendum in Italy
In recent years, both Turkey and Italy have undergone critical turning points that redefine the influence of judicial institutions over the political sphere. In Turkey, the arrest and trial of Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, facing up to 2,430 years in prison and a potential political ban, has triggered a deep crisis that questions the position of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive and the fairness of democratic competition. Following the 2016 coup attempt, Turkey experienced sweeping judicial purges, a transition to a presidential system, and a restructuring of the high judiciary. These developments significantly concentrated state power in the hands of the President and produced a structural transformation that weakened judicial independence. The 2025 İmamoğlu case, therefore, represents more than an individual criminal trial; it stands as a symbolic illustration of how the legal framework that governs political competition increasingly functions in favour of the ruling power.
Meanwhile, in Italy, the justice reform proposed by the Meloni government aiming to separate the career paths of prosecutors and judges and to restructure the High Council of the Judiciary has been put forward for a constitutional referendum. Should the reform be approved in the popular vote expected in March–April 2026, it will redefine the institutional role of the judiciary and its position vis-à-vis political authority, while simultaneously producing a result that strengthens the legitimacy of the Meloni government. Although the process in Italy unfolds within democratic mechanisms, the potential “Yes” outcome raises significant debates due to its capacity to transform the judiciary’s relationship with political power.
This article seeks to examine, from a comparative perspective, the links between the political-judicial pressure mechanism made visible through the İmamoğlu trial in Turkey and the Meloni government’s decision to submit justice reform to a referendum in Italy. Despite the two countries’ markedly different institutional structures and democratic practices, they converge on a fundamental question: does the judiciary function as a safeguard that reinforces democratic competition, or is it increasingly becoming an instrument, through which the executive consolidates its political objectives? This comparison allows us to analyze how the role of the judiciary in modern democracies is being reshaped, how such transformations recalibrate the balance of power between the government and the opposition, and how these developments ultimately affect the quality and resilience of democracy itself.
What Has Happened in Turkey? And What Is Happening Now? The Transition to Autocracy between 2016–2025 in Turkey
Turkey’s apparent democratization in the early 2000s has, over the past decade, given way to a systematic autocratic transformation. As Nistor and Popescu argue, Erdoğan’s rule has evolved into an authoritarian trajectory characterized by “control over the press, the erosion of judicial independence, and the repression of political opposition” (Nistor & Popescu, 2025). According to a 2025 SWP analysis, Turkey is no longer merely a country exhibiting authoritarian tendencies but one “at risk of a complete shift toward autocracy” (Aydın, 2025).
The failed coup attempt of 2016 provided Erdoğan’s government with the opportunity to conduct large-scale purges and expand executive power without constraint. In the words of Nistor and Popescu, it “transformed the presidency into a dominant executive organ,” accelerating authoritarian consolidation (2025). Thousands of judges and prosecutors were dismissed under emergency decrees, replaced largely by individuals aligned with the executive. The 2017 constitutional amendments, which introduced a presidential system, institutionalized this concentration of power and rendered the judiciary structurally dependent on the executive. Consequently, the period from 2016 to 2025 marks a transitional phase in which authoritarianism became institutionalized and the judiciary emerged as a strategic instrument of political power.
Despite the many critical and often tragic developments that marked this decade, the sudden arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu in 2025 generated a shockwave across the country. Long admired across the political spectrum, the injustice faced by İmamoğlu prompted hundreds of thousands to take to the streets in cities across Turkey. Their slogan was both meaningful and symbolic: “Hak, Hukuk, Adalet” (“Rights, Law, Justice”).
Detained on 19 March 2025 and arrested on 23 March, İmamoğlu is not only Istanbul’s elected mayor but also widely regarded as the strongest opposition candidate for the presidency. His arrest, therefore, represents more than an individual legal case. As Nistor and Popescu (2025) underline, it is “a sign that genuine electoral competition in Turkey has effectively ended” and reflects a direct attempt to remove Erdoğan’s most formidable rival from the political arena. According to Cem Tecimer, the process constitutes a “textbook case of lawfare,” aimed explicitly at “eliminating the rising opposition and consolidating single-party rule” (Tecimer, 2025). The SWP report similarly argues that the proceedings against İmamoğlu reinforce the perception that legal processes in Turkey now operate transparently in line with the interests of the ruling power (Aydın, 2025).
Tecimer’s analysis highlights that the judicial pressure against İmamoğlu is multidimensional. First, the process involves multiple fronts: simultaneous criminal, administrative, and financial investigations create a state of constant and comprehensive legal encirclement, resembling a “press all the buttons” strategy. President Erdoğan’s direct involvement in the İmamoğlu case is among the clearest indicators that the process is part of a broader political engineering effort (Aydın, 2025).
The pressure is also multi-purpose: each case serves a different political objective. For example, the administrative decision revoking İmamoğlu’s university diploma aims to prevent him from running for the presidency, while corruption allegations allow the Ministry of Interior to remove him from office under the Municipal Law. The lawfare campaign is likewise multi-actor: coordinated action by pro-government media, MASAK (the financial crimes authority), police, prosecutors, judges, and even universities demonstrates, as Tecimer puts it, the emergence of a “well-organized and coercive state apparatus.”
Furthermore, the sheer volume of charges such as 142 protest-related actions, 70 bid-rigging claims, 47 bribery allegations, plus numerous money-laundering and fraud accusations reveals a “multi-front pressure strategy” aimed not at judicial accountability but at achieving İmamoğlu’s political destruction (BBC Türkçe, 2025). This picture is reinforced by blatant inconsistencies and arbitrariness in the legal proceedings. While similar allegations against government-aligned figures are routinely dismissed or not pursued at all, hundreds of pages of indictments are prepared for İmamoğlu. Meanwhile, the entirely lawful electoral alliance between the DEM Party (pro-Kurdish political party in Türkiye) and the CHP has been reframed by the government as “aiding a terrorist organization,” even though the same government negotiated with the PKK (the armed Kurdish militant organization, internationally designated as terrorist) in the past. This illustrates the selective, partisan use of the judiciary.
The arrest decision itself is based not on substantive evidence but on the crime’s classification as a “catalogue offense,” allowing the court to infer “risk of flight” without factual justification. As Tecimer notes, this reflects the persistence of judicial practices in Turkey that fail to meet basic principles of due process. Moreover, the proposal put forward by Erdoğan and Bahçeli to broadcast the trial live on the state broadcaster TRT underscores the government’s intention to transform the legal process into a political spectacle. This confirms that the judiciary in Turkey now functions not as an independent institution, but as a tool of political propaganda (BBC Türkçe, 2025).
Taken together, the period from 2016 to 2025 represents Turkey’s shift from competitive authoritarianism to an increasingly non-competitive authoritarian model. The İmamoğlu case is a symbolic manifestation of this new system, one in which democratic competition is no longer merely constrained but structurally undermined.
Meloni’s Justice Reform and the Path to the Referendum
The Meloni government’s decision to submit its justice reform to a national referendum has not only initiated an institutional transformation but has also reignited a fundamental debate on the role of the judiciary within Italy’s political system. While the content of the reform includes far-reaching measures, such as the strict separation of prosecutors’ and judges’ career paths, the division of the CSM into two bodies and the creation of a largely lottery-selected disciplinary court, public debate has focused less on these technical aspects and more on the implications for the future balance between the executive and the judiciary.
One of the strongest criticisms has come from Democratic Party leader Elly Schlein, who argues that the project does not constitute a genuine justice reform. In her own words:
“Questa non è una riforma della giustizia… Non interverrà sulla lunghezza dei processi, sul sovraffollamento carcerario, né sulle misure alternative. L’obiettivo è un altro: indebolire l’indipendenza della magistratura perché sia più assoggettata al potere di chi governa.” (Elly Schlein, press statements, 30 October 2025)
Schlein emphasizes that the reform aims less at resolving structural inefficiencies of the justice system and more at expanding the executive’s leverage over the judiciary. According to her, the project sends a political message that “the law is no longer equal for everyone.” She also stresses the unprecedented fact that the reform passed “four parliamentary readings without a single amendment,” illustrating its almost uncontested progression through Parliament. Schlein describes the issue even more starkly:
“Il punto è semplice: Meloni… ha detto che questa riforma serve a lei per avere le mani libere e porsi al di sopra della Costituzione.” (Schlein, 2025)
These statements are critical to understanding the intense political polarization surrounding the reform. Supporters argue that it will break judicial corporatism and enhance accountability, while opponents insist that Meloni seeks to shield the executive from judicial oversight. The referendum campaign mirrors this divide. Schlein has framed the vote as a test of democracy itself: “Se si pensa che i giudici debbano obbedire a chi governa, allora si può votare ‘Sì’. Ma se si pensa che anche chi governa debba rispettare la Costituzione, bisogna votare ‘No’.” (Elly Schlein, 2025)
Thus, the reform has evolved from a technical constitutional amendment into a plebiscite on judicial independence and the limits of executive power. The discursive clash across Italy’s political spectrum illustrates that the referendum’s outcome will be shaped not only by legal assessments but also by citizens’ perceptions of democracy and institutional trust. Within this framework, the Italian debate intersects with the Turkish case of Ekrem İmamoğlu: in both countries, the tension between electoral legitimacy, judicial independence, and executive authority has become a critical fault line reshaping the boundaries of democracy.
Historical Context: Italy’s Longstanding Justice Referendum Tradition
As the Meloni government moves toward the referendum, it becomes evident that the current debate concerns not only the future of executive–judicial relations but also the legal architecture and historical trajectory of the referendum instrument itself. Italy’s justice-referendum dynamic is not new. Over the past decade, the country has witnessed another major attempt to overhaul the justice system through direct popular consultation. As Pagella Politica and Questione Giustizia note
“Dal 2 luglio 2021 è in corso la raccolta delle firme… per indire un referendum popolare abrogativo volto a incidere su alcuni degli aspetti più significativi e al tempo stesso controversi del sistema giustizia del nostro Paese.”
This initiative, led by the Radical Party and Lega through the “Giustizia Giusta” committee, proposed six referendum questions addressing nearly every core element of the justice system.
These included:
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the election of CSM members,
•
direct civil liability for judges,
•
the separation of judicial careers,
•
limits on custodia cautelare,
•
and even the full repeal of the Decreto Severino.
The career-separation question was phrased as follows: “Volete voi che siano abrogati… tutte le disposizioni che consentono il passaggio dalle funzioni giudicanti a quelle requirenti e viceversa?” indicating that the prosecutor–judge divide has been one of the most contentious issues in Italy for decades. Similarly, the proposal allowing citizens to sue magistrates directly would have reversed a foundational constitutional principle:
“Volete voi che sia abrogata… la disciplina che limita la responsabilità civile del magistrato impedendo azioni dirette contro il singolo giudice?”
The common thread among these initiatives is clear: for decades, the Italian judiciary has occupied the centre of political conflict, with left and right blocs maintaining fundamentally opposed visions of judicial independence and accountability. This historical backdrop transforms Meloni’s 2025–’26 reform from a mere technical adjustment into the continuation of a long-standing political battle.
Moreover, as Pagella Politica explains, the referendum mechanism itself carries a unique legal status: “La legge sottoposta a referendum non è promulgata se non è approvata dalla maggioranza dei voti validi, ma non ha bisogno del quorum.” This makes the reform a high-risk political gamble: even a low-turnout but highly mobilized electorate could determine its fate. Schlein’s repeated warnings reflect this vulnerability: “Questa non è una riforma della giustizia… Serve ad avere una giustizia su misura…” Thus, Meloni’s reform simultaneously reflects the historical demands of Italy’s right especially in the post-Berlusconi era and marks a new stage in the executive’s attempt to redefine its relationship with the judiciary.
Academic Debate: A Question of Power, Not Efficiency
Italian academia has also rejected the government’s narrative that the reform aims to “increase efficiency.” Giovanni Verde, writing for Il Sole 24 Ore, articulates this critique clearly: “La riforma avrà scarse o nulle ricadute sull’efficienza del servizio, avendo come obiettivo quello del riequilibrio tra i poteri dello Stato.” Verde argues that the reform does not address Italy’s primary judicial issues lengthy trials, lack of digitalization, or structural bottlenecks. Instead, it redefines the boundaries between the three branches of power. For this reason, he warns that the referendum represents a direct test of democracy: “Sarebbe necessaria una robusta partecipazione al voto, dato che la riforma in qualche modo riguarda il modo di essere della nostra democrazia.” Moreover, Verde underlines that the reform risks weakening, not strengthening, judicial independence. While the separation of careers appears to increase autonomy, it may instead create prosecutors who possess “absolute but uncontrolled power.”
He writes; “La riforma… accentua l’autonomia e l’indipendenza dei pubblici ministeri… il cui potere di indagine diventa del tutto incontrollabile.” This raises the possibility that prosecutors
detached from judicial oversight could become more vulnerable to political influence, thereby undermining the traditional checks and balances of the system.
Verde identifies two core issues:
1.
A full structural separation would push Italy closer to the Anglo-Saxon prosecutorial model.
2.
It would erode the principle of obbligatorietà dell’azione penale, weakening protections against political pressure.
Thus he concludes; “Il cittadino non si lasci ingannare… Il voto a favore della separazione sarebbe giustificato solo se si volessero porre le premesse per avvicinare il nostro sistema di giustizia penale a quello angloamericano.” Paolo Balduzzi also warns that the referendum’s consequences will be profound regardless of the result. A “Yes” victory would conclude a decades-long political conflict, whereas a “No” would constitute a direct political defeat for Meloni and Justice Minister Nordio potentially echoing Matteo Renzi’s failed constitutional referendum of 2016. (Source: Paolo Balduzzi, “La riforma della giustizia alla battaglia finale”, Lavoce.info, 07/11/2025)
The referendum unfolding in Italy is therefore far more than a judicial amendment: it is a plebiscite on the country’s democratic balance of power, the separation of powers, and the future of executive accountability. By situating Meloni’s reform within Italy’s broader history of judicial referendums, it becomes clear that the government views this moment as a deliberate mechanism for consolidating political power. This framing strengthens the comparative link with Turkey: just as the İmamoğlu case exposes the fault lines between judiciary and politics in Turkey, Italy’s justice reform forces the public to confront where the boundaries between judicial independence and executive authority should lie.
What is the Connection? What Are the Future Implications?
The prosecution of Ekrem İmamoğlu in Turkey and the Meloni government’s decision to submit its justice reform to a referendum in Italy point to a shared structural challenge faced by modern democracies despite the two countries’ vastly different political traditions, institutional architectures, and democratic trajectories. In both cases, the central issue revolves around the question formulated in the introduction: Will the judiciary remain a safeguard that protects democratic competition, or will it become an instrument that reinforces the political objectives of the executive? In Türkiye, the İmamoğlu case represents the consolidation of a lawfare regime in which the judiciary is employed to restrict the political field unilaterally. In Italy, by contrast, the constitutional reform radically restructuring the judiciary is being pursued through democratic procedures, yet it raises a similar question of legitimacy by recalibrating the balance of power between the executive and the magistrature. Taken together, these developments highlight a broader phenomenon: in contemporary democracies, the judiciary is no longer merely an interpreter of law, but a strategic actor capable of shaping the direction and the boundaries of political competition itself. Therefore, the processes unfolding in both Türkiye and Italy offer critical insight into how the transformation of the judiciary reshapes opposition–government dynamics and deepens the fragility of democratic regimes.
The trajectory Türkiye has followed in recent years culminating in the prosecution of Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, facing the threat of 2,430 years in prison and the suppression of political competition through judicial instruments, demonstrates, in stark and painful terms, how judicial politicization can rapidly push a country outside the democratic order. The criminalization of a mayor, particularly the elected leader of the country’s largest and most strategic city, because he is perceived as a political threat, stands as one of the clearest indicators of how the loss of judicial independence produces a rupture in the democratic system that is extraordinarily difficult to reverse.
For this reason, Italy’s ongoing debate surrounding the justice reform and the upcoming referendum is not merely a technical constitutional adjustment; it represents an existential crossroads regarding the future of the balance of powers. What Türkiye has experienced serves as a powerful warning for Italy: once the judiciary falls under the shadow of political influence, it no longer administers justice, it becomes the most effective instrument of political coercion. The systematic neutralization of democratic opposition in Türkiye through judicial action illustrates that institutions endure not because of legal texts alone, but because society defends and protects their independence.
This article does not aim to lecture any country; rather, it reflects the sincere caution of a society that has witnessed first-hand the consequences of losing judicial independence and hopes that Italy does not find itself on a similar path. In conclusion, the decision Italy will make in the 2026 referendum will shape not only the present, but also the democratic security of future generations. One hopes that Italy will not be forced to witness the painful and costly trajectory that Türkiye has already experienced.
Bengisu Kaya, intern at the Centro per la Pace Forlì
Referance List:
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Tecimer, Cem: The Arrest of Istanbul’s Mayor is TextbookLawfare, VerfBlog, 2025/3/28, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-arrest-of-istanbuls-mayor-is-textbook-lawfare/, DOI: 10.59704/a90a551daa4f28f6.
Nistor, A., & Popescu, F.-A. (2025, November 17). ERDOĞAN’S TURKEY: BETWEEN THE DREAM OF DEMOCRACY AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TEMPTATION. HeinOnline. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/agoraijjs2025&div=29&id=&page=
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Non è una riforma della giustizia, serve solo a dire che la legge non è uguale per tutti. (2025, October 30). Partito Democratico. https://partitodemocratico.it/schlein-non-e-una-riforma-della-giustizia-serve-solo-a-dire-che-la-legge-non-e-uguale-per-tutti/
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